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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will test the proposition of several commentators that
the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (hereinafter FTAC) of the
Soviet Union has acquired a reputation for fairness and objectivity in
its capacity as the primary arbitrator of international trade disputes
between Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations (FTO's) and the Soviet
Union's international trading partners.' This proposition will be ex-
1. In general, as support for the proposition, see T.W. HOYA, EAST-WEST TRADE
54 (1984); Kotlarchuk, Has the U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
Reached the Age of Aquarius with the Newly Revised Arbitration Statute of 1975?,
(135)
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amined by means of an analysis of FTAC decisions concerning the doc-
trine of force majeure as an excuse for nonperformance of private in-
ternational trade agreements. The analysis will examine all cases
reported in English between 1932 and 1965 where a party before the
FTAC raised a force majeure argument as an excuse to the perform-
ance of a contract. 2 This examination will focus on the general inter-
pretation of force majeure by the FTAC; the relationship of that inter-
pretation of force majeure to its usage in Soviet domestic law; the
relationship of the Soviet interpretation of force majeure with the
traditional understanding of the doctrine in international trade; and the
consistency of FTAC decisions in applying force majeure principles on
a case-by-case basis. Analysis of the last item is for the purpose of
ascertaining whether any subjective "political" factors may influence
the FTAC decision-making process to the extent that it must be consid-
ered a politicized, and therefore, an unreliable organization for resolv-
ing private international trade disputes.
II. BACKGROUND OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE: HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW
Fundamental, of course, to any understanding of Soviet foreign
trade practice, its legal system, and for that matter any aspect of the
Soviet system, is the fact that the U.S.S.R. is a socialist state. Article 1
of the Soviet Constitution provides that "[tihe Union of Soviet Socialist
11 INT'L LAW. 467, 470 (1977); Berman & Bustin, The Soviet System of Foreign
Trade, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION 25, 49-51 (R. Starr ed.
1975); Holtzmann, Settlement of Disputes: The Role of Arbitration in East-West
Trade, in EAST-WEST BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 552 (R. Starr ed. 1974); King-Smith,
Communist Foreign Trade Arbitration, 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 34, 39 (1969). Not sur-
prisingly the FTAC had not received universal acclaim among Western commentators.
Criticisms generally focus on the possible structural bias of the FTAC. Such criticisms
are discussed in more detail in the text, infra at notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
See generally Pizar, The Communist System of Foreign Trade Adjudication, 72
HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1959); Domke, The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration 53 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 787 (1959); Jeff, The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the U.S.S.R.
and the West, 24 ARB. J. I (1969).
2. The time frame 1932-1965 is used as it corresponds with the only systematic
publication in English of FTAC decisions. Such cases were compiled by A.I.
Shpektorov in Russian, and translated into English as Collected Arbitration Awards of
the U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Commission, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION (1980). References to particular awards, infra, are by award number. Also, trans-
lations of specific cases can occasionally be found in English in the annual series YEAR-
BOOK: COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (P. Sanders ed.), INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Kluwer 1976) and various issues of FOREIGN TRADE, a
Soviet journal available in English, published in Moscow.
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Republics is a socialist state of the whole people. . .. "I
From the outset of the Soviet regime, foreign trade has been an
important concern for Soviet policy-makers. The Bolsheviks, in power
for only six months, declared by decree on April 22, 1918, that "all
foreign trade is nationalized."' The "monopolization" of foreign trade
was desirable for the Bolsheviks' "[s]trict government control over ex-
ports and imports... [and it] would permit them to shape the Russian
economy according to their designs for socialism."'5 Lenin maintained
that without the monopolization "we shall not be able to 'get rid' of
foreign capital by paying 'tribute,' " and therefore, the Bolsheviks
would be constrained in their attempts to build an independent socialist
economy.6
International trade, for the young Soviet regime, was one of the
two primary goals of Soviet diplomacy in the twenties; the other being,
of course, diplomatic recognition.7 "Economic assistance from abroad,
in the form of trade, credits, loans, and concessions, was considered
essential for reconstruction of Russia's war-torn economy." Monopoli-
zation of international trade allowed the Bolsheviks, within operational
capacities, the flexibility to structure that trade in their perceived
interests.9
The Bolsheviks, however, as with many other aspects of immediate
post-revolutionary policy, found issuing decrees easier than implement-
ing them. Apparently, "no firms were ever nationalized as [a] result of
[the 1918 decree]." 10 What the nationalization decree of 1918 appar-
ently meant to the Bolsheviks was monopolization, which, in turn, was
defined as "the exclusive right to conduct export and import
operations."' 1
As the Soviet regime consolidated power and international trade
expanded through the 1920s and 1930s, several interrelated trends de-
veloped in the structure of Soviet foreign trade which have continued,
with some reform, to the present. Those trends include: the operational
autonomy of agencies charged with foreign trade; the product speciali-
zation of these agencies; the development of trade delegations as ad-
3. Article I of chapter I of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of
the Soviet Socialist Republics (1977), excerpts printed in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW 135
(V. Pozdnyakov ed. 1982).
4. J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY 3 (1974).
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Id. at 23.
8. Id. at 23.
9. Id. at 14.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 15.
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junct organizations to Soviet diplomatic missions abroad; and the sys-
tem of economic accountability of each operational agency.12
These autonomous operational "agencies," each economically ac-
countable in its own right and organized according to product speciali-
zation, have evolved into today's Foreign Trade Organizations (FTO's).
Each is ultimately accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the
U.S.S.R. which "plans and directs a worldwide trade network."'" Most
FTO's are located in Moscow.' 4
Another constant throughout the evolution of the Soviet regime is
its commitment to international trade as a means of promoting Soviet
interests and policy, both domestically and internationally. Former
Politburo member and Prime Minister, Nikolai Tikhonov, wrote in
1983, that "[tlhe constructive development of international economic
relations has always been the antithesis of tension and a means of
building up confidence between peoples and states.' 5 Moreover,
Tikhonov elaborates:
[t]he Soviet leaders have invariably held and continue to hold the
view that progress in the field of developing international economic
relations helps deepen and expand detente. The link between the
equitable and mutually advantageous co-operation of all States and
the problems of promoting the security of peoples, curbing the arms
race and achieving disarmament is fully taken into account in the
foreign-policy activities of our State.' 6
I1. THE LEGAL SRUCTURE OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
The 1977 Soviet Constitution provides at Article 73:
[t]he jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as rep-
resented by its highest bodies of State authority and administration,
shall cover: [at paragraph 10] representation of the USSR in inter-
national relations; . . . foreign trade and other forms of external
economic activity on the basis of State monopoly.
12. Id. at 46-50, 64. These trends are discussed in detail infra at Parts III and
IV.
13. Id. at 81.
14. For a discussion of the implications of this location, see notes 20-24 and ac-
companying text.
15. N.A. TIKHONOV, SOVIET ECONOMY: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS
157 (1983).
16. Id. at 162.
17. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3 at 141-42.
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The highest state authority charged with exercising the state monopoly
of foreign trade is the Foreign Trade Ministry. 8 The Minister of For-
eign Trade "direct[s] the USSR's foreign trade and . . . issue[s] or-
ders concerning foreign trade." '19
There are two principal sources of law governing Soviet foreign
trade and FTO's. Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Fundamentals of Civil
Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics provides:
"[rlelationships in foreign trade are determined by the special legisla-
tion of the USSR which regulates foreign trade, and by the general
civil legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics." 0 An example
of special legislation of the U.S.S.R. governing foreign trade is the
1978 Statute on FTO's issued by decree of the Council of Ministers. 1
In addition to these sources:
Soviet law governing foreign trade may also include international
agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party, international cus-
tom recognized by the Soviet Union, and Soviet judicial practice, or
more significantly, practice of the Soviet [FTAC].22
For the reasons set out below, the primary source of statutory law to be
discussed in this paper is the Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Feder-
ated Socialist Republic (RSFSR Civil Code). The reason for concen-
trating on the RSFSR Civil Code is the practical fact that: "[t]he geo-
graphical area subject to the RSFSR Civil Code. . .includes Moscow,
where most FTO's are located and where most of the Soviet foreign
trade contracts concluded in the U.S.S.R. are signed."23 Furthermore,
the danger that the RSFSR Civil Code might somehow conflict with
the Soviet Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation is mitigated by
18. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 4, at 81. Also, such authority was recently codified in
the statute on the All-Union Self-Supporting Foreign Trade Organization incorporated
in the System of the Ministry of Foreign Trade by decree of the Council of Ministers
of the U.S.S.R. of May 31, 1978, No. 416. (Collected Decisions of the Government of
the U.S.S.R., 1978, No. 13, Art. 91) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Statute]. Excerpts
printed in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 186-93.
19. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 4, at 82. Also "The minister of foreign trade . . . is
appointed by the Supreme Soviet on recommendation of the chairman of the Council of
Ministers." Id. at 81.
20. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 144.
21. See 1978 Statute, supra note 18.
22. T. W. HOYA, EAST WEST TRADE, supra note 1, at 287. Article 129 of the
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics essentially
provide that in the event of a conflict between an international treaty provision and a
civil law provision, the international treaty controls. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra
note 3, at 149.
23. T.W. HOYA, supra note 1, at 286.
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the fact that: "[tfhese Fundamental Principles are essentially repro-
duced as well as elaborated upon in the RSFSR Civil Code, so that the
latter serves effectively as a single source of most of the Soviet general
civil legislation applicable to foreign trade."'"
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF FTO's: LEGAL ORGANIZATION AND
FUNCTIONS
FTO's have been described as "[b]y far the most active, or at least
the most visible, of the instrumentalities of the Soviet foreign trade mo-
nopoly.25 An FTO is:
created pursuant to a decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers
and operates within the scope of authority defined in a charter is-
sued by a high government authority, in most cases the Ministry of
Foreign Trade.26
This charter structure for FTO's has several significant legal and
practical consequences. Most significant is that "from a strictly legal
standpoint . . . the FTO is an independent juridical entity. '2 7 The So-
viet state "is not liable under Soviet law for the obligations of the FTO,
nor is the FTO liable for the obligations of the Soviet state or any state
organization other than itself."' 28 Therefore, any recovery against an
FTO is limited to the capital allocated to it by its charter.29
24. Id. at 287. In case a conflict actually develops, the Fundamental Principles of
the U.S.S.R. are supreme, per Article 74 of the Constitution. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT
LAW, supra note 3.
25. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 30. The other visible instrument of Soviet
foreign trade would be the trade representatives of the U.S.S.R. As Berman and Bustin
discuss at page 29, these representatives "are component parts of embassies or other
diplomatic corps of the Soviet Union abroad, and the full panoply of diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities is claimed for them. Although they perform some of the same
functions as FTO's (negotiate and conclude contracts) a fundamental distinction be-
tween trade representatives and FTO's is that the former are not legal entities under
Soviet law, and "absen[t] a treaty provision to the contrary, [they] may - and will -
invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity to avoid the jurisdiction of foreign courts."
26. Hoya & Stein, Drafting Contracts in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Trade, 7 L. &
POL'Y IN INT'L. Bus. 1057, 1059 (1975). See also notes 3 and 16.
27. Hoya & Stein, supra note 26, at 1059.
28. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 31; see also Naryshkina, Legal Status of
All-Union Foreign Trade and Other Organizations Authorized to Conclude Foreign
Trade Transactions, in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 24, 28 (citing Arti-
cle 13 of the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Repub-
lics and Articles 32 and 33 of the Civil Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic).
29. Naryshkina, supra note 28, at 28 (referring to Article 22 of the Fundamental
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Also of significance is that, "the scope of authority of each FTO is
carefully defined in its charter [and] a transaction . . . outside this
authority would be invalid under Soviet law as an ultra vires act."30
Apparently, under Soviet law the doctrine of ultra vires is strictly
construed. 31
An FTO's charter also has practical consequences. An FTO is
chartered according to its function and such function is usually "de-
fined in terms either of product or of geographic market or of type of
service." 32 One cannot imply from this statement, however, that an
FTO charged with exporting a particular product actually is responsi-
ble for producing that good. Rather, "[t]he FTO functions as a middle-
man. What it exports, it has not produced itself but has obtained from
a Soviet domestic enterprise: and what it imports, it transfers for use or
consumption to a Soviet domestic enterprise." 33
This functional organization of FTO's facilitates two principal
goals for Soviet decision-makers. One is to help ensure the economic
accountability of each FTO.34 Two, it helps to enforce the separate ju-
ridical identity of FTO's.3 5
Several criticisms have been raised as to the structure of FTO's as
exclusively middlemen in trade transactions. One such criticism "has
been that FTO personnel lack technical knowledge concerning their
product lines," notwithstanding the functional specialization of
FTO's."6 A second potential problem is that given the well-known
under-capitalization of FTO's, a foreign party might have difficulties in
executing a judgment or arbitral award against an FTO.3 7 As a practi-
cal matter, however, this latter concern may be overstated as, "in prac-
tice no case is known where an award made by the FTAC . . . in favor
of a foreign party has not been carried out by a Soviet debtor [FTOJ
Legislation of the U.S.S.R .... and Article 98 of the RSFSR Civil Code).
30. Hoya & Stein, supra note 26, at 1059.
31. Id.
32. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 31.
33. Hoya & Stein, supra note 26, at 1059.
34. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 31.
35. Id.
36. Shillinglaw & Stein, Doing Business in the Soviet Union, 13 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 4 (1981).
37. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 42-43 (stating that "The amount of basic
capitalization of the FTO is completely within the control of the Soviet state, and they
are notoriously under-capitalized. The authorized capital of most of them has been set
at about five million rubles. Five million rubles - which is now worth about six and a
half million dollars at the official rate of exchange - should be measured against obli-
gations incurred by Soviet FTOs toward individual Western firms amounting to tens
and hundreds of millions of dollars.").
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voluntarily." 38
Overall, therefore, the structure of FTO's as independent legal en-
tities serves several functions for Soviet policy-makers. It allows for the
pursuit of foreign trade goals with functionally specialized agencies ec-
onomically accountable to the Soviet state.39 Domestically, when FTO's
enter into binding contracts with other economically accountable Soviet
state enterprises, this structure can serve much the same function for
the centrally planned economy. 0
A. FTO's Operating Procedures
By early 1980, there were approximately forty-five FTO's, ac-
counting for "[a]bout 95 percent of the country's foreign trade ex-
change."41 These FTO's, collectively, have acquired the "reputation of
being hard bargainers. '4 2 Generally, at the conclusion of negotiations
with a foreign party, an Fro "offers one of its own form contracts and
urges its adoption.143 These contracts "uniformly call for arbitration as
the exclusive means of resolving disputes." 4 Furthermore, over the
years, Soviet negotiators bargained hard, and usually won, agreement
to arbitrate disputes before the FTAC in Moscow."
A second common feature of the standard FTO contract that is of
interest to this paper is the "restrictive force majeure clause."14 6 As
these clauses are the subject matter of the analysis to follow, it is noted
here only as a factor to be considered in any trade negotiation with
FTO's.
The Soviet FTO's, although hard-bargainers, are not prohibited by
Soviet law from agreeing to arbitrate disputes outside of Moscow, or
for that matter, from agreeing to a non-Soviet body of contract law in
any arbitration procedure. Additionally, the particulars of any force
majeure clause are open to negotiation. Several legal and practical con-
38. Lebedev, U.S.S.R.-National Report, in I Y.B. COMM. ARB. 91, 102 (P. Sand-
ers ed. 1976). The author here found nothing which contradicts the Soviet author's
claim.
39. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 31.
40. Id.
41. Naryshkina, supra note 28, at 24.
42. T. W. HOYA, supra note 1, at 286.
43. Hoya & Stein, supra note 26, at 1064.
44. Id. at 1098.
45. Id. at 1099. However, these commentators have noted that the Soviets have
been more willing to arbitrate in neutral countries, particularly Sweden, on U.S.-Soviet
trade agreements. The Soviets have exhibited this willingness ever since the writing of
the never-ratified U.S. - U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement Act of 1972 which was drafted as
a means of encouraging third country arbitration.
46. Id. at 1057.
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siderations, however, collectively suggest that most trade disputes are
arbitrated before the FTAC under Soviet contract law.
As a practical matter, "[b]ecause of their monopoly-like powers,
[FTO's] are often able to force their trading partner to accede to...
submitting .. .to Soviet arbitration and Soviet law. ' '4 7 Secondly, of
legal significance, is that while Article 566, paragraph I of the RSFSR
Civil Code permits parties to agree to a choice of law for foreign trade
transactions:
[in] the absence of such agreement the rights and obligations of the
parties to a foreign trade transaction are governed by the law of the
place where it is concluded, i.e., the principle of lex loci contractus
is applied. The place of conclusion of the transaction is determined
by Soviet law.4 8
Three related Soviet laws reinforce the likelihood that most FTO
contracts will be interpreted as having been concluded in Moscow, and
therefore, will be controlled by Soviet law. Those three provisions are:
1) the requirement that all foreign trade contracts be in writing; 2) the
requirement that all contracts be signed by two authorized individuals;
and 3) the legislation which provides that the signature procedure is
controlled by Soviet law regardless of where the contract is signed.,9
These factors support the conclusion that most foreign trade disputes
conducted before the FTAC will be subject to Soviet state contract
law. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that most FTO's are
located in Moscow, and therefore, most contracts are signed and con-
47. Norberg, & Stein, Arbitration of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Disputes, in BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 175, 177 (R. Starr ed. 1975).
48. Sadikov, General Characteristics of the USSR Legal System, in U.S.S.R.
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 9, 13. See also Article 126 of Fundamentals of Civil
Legislation of the U.S.S.R. (reprinted in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at
147).
49. T. W. HOYA, supra note 1, at 289. The relevant legislation for the writing
requirement is found at Article 17, chapter 1, of the 1978 Statute and Model By-laws
for FTOs. For a full reference see supra note 18. All FTO charters must comply with
these by-laws pursuant to chapter 1, article 1, paragraph 12. The relevant legislation
for the signature requirements is Decree of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.,
Feb. 14, 1978, Sub. Pos. Pra. U.S.S.R. (1978), No. 6, item 107, para. 1. See also
U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 194-95. The legislation providing that So-
viet law controls signature procedure is Article 125 of Fundamental Principles of Civil
Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and Article 565 of the RSFSR Civil Code. The explana-
tions offered for these rather elaborate signature and writing requirements are twofold:
one offered by J. QUIGLEY, supra note 4, at 44, is historical - that is, early Soviet fear
of Western businessmen and courts; and two, the more general need for control mecha-
nisms in a centrally planned economy.
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cluded in Moscow.
B. Recent Legislation Affecting FTO's
The Soviets, possibly in partial response to Western criticism con-
cerning the lack of technical expertise of FTO negotiators, as well as
the need to respond to the increasing specialization of its foreign trade,
have enacted legislation to streamline FTO's.50 This was the first legis-
lation that adopted a specific status for FTO's.5 1 It formally declared
that FTO's are "established by the Ministry of Foreign Trade in accor-
dance with legislation of the USSR.""2 Furthermore, the legislation
formalized the long-standing practice, noted earlier, that "[a]ctivities
of the [FTO's] are directed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. .... ,53
The legislation also formalized the interrelationship between the man-
agement of FTO's and the Foreign Trade Ministry in terms of fulfilling
five year plans and specific tasks of FTO's." Additionally, the legisla-
tion provided that an FTO "uses the state property allocated to
it. . . [,] it has an independent balance and is a legal person." 55
Article 6 of the Model By-Laws contains the legislation's major
innovation in the structure of an FTO. By Article 6, an FTO is in ef-
fect permitted to subincorporate into more specialized firms known as
Foreign Trade Firms (FTF).5 The purpose of this reorganization was
"to bring the system of Soviet foreign trade into accord with various
branches of the Soviet economy [as well as to facilitate further] export
and import operations for definite classes of goods."157
For Western commentators, the immediate problem created by the
establishment of FTF's is that while these firms have the right to con-
clude foreign trade transactions in the name of FTO's, an FTF is not a
50. Shillinglaw & Stein, supra note 36, at 4-6.
51. Rabinovich, The Legal Status of Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations in View
of New Soviet Legislation, 15 INT'L LAW. 233 (1981). For a full reference to the legis-
lation, see supra note 18.
52. Ch. 1, art. 2, para. I of 1978 Statute, reprinted in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 3, at 186.
53. Ch. 1, art. 2, para. 2 of 1978 Statute, reprinted in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 3, at 186.
54. Ch. 1, articles 3 & 4 of 1978 Statute, reprinted in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 3, at 186-87.
55. Ch. 1, article 5 of 1978 Statute, reprinted in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra
note 3, at 187. Article 23 of the RSFSR Civil Code "gives the concept of legal person
to an organization which possesses separate property." Rabinovich, supra note 51, at
236.
56. Rabinovich, supra note 51, at 233.
57. Id. at 233-34.
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legal person in its own right.58 This somewhat hybrid organization, the
FTF, renews the commentators concerns mentioned earlier, that a for-
eign trade transaction may be declared an ultra vires transaction. Arti-
cle 26 of the RSFSR Civil Code provides that "a legal person is enti-
tled to civil rights and is to be burdened with obligations only in
accordance with the established purposes of its activities." 9 Unfortu-
nately, a detailed discussion of the various opinions as to the resolution
of potential ultra vires problems is beyond the scope of this paper.
Therefore, the reader must be referred to the above-cited commenta-
tors for a discussion of the various positions on this problem.
With the general description of the Soviet foreign trade process
complete, an examination of the procedures used for resolving disputes
between FTO's and their non-Soviet trading partners follows.60
V. FEDERAL TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION
A. Historical Background
The FTAC of the Soviet Union was created by a resolution of the
Central Executive Committee and Council of Peoples' Commissions of
the U.S.S.R. on June 17, 1932:
[f]or the settlement of disputes arising from foreign trade transac-
tions, in particular, disputes between foreign firms and Soviet eco-
nomic organizations in arbitral proceedings under the auspices of
the All-Union Chamber of Commerce."
The FTAC initially "was modelled in its organization and proce-
dure on English and German arbitral bodies.""2 A significant difference
between the FTAC and the generally more specialized arbitral bodies
in the West is that the FTAC "is open to all kinds of commercial liti-
gation where one or two of the parties are of a foreign nationality."63
The creation of the FTAC was a reflection of the somewhat con-
tradictory goals and perceptions of early Soviet leaders. One such per-
58. Ch. 1, article 6, para. 2, of 1978 Statute, reprinted in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT
LAW, supra note 3, at 187; see generally Rabinovich, supra note 51.
59. Rabinovich, supra note 51, at 234.
60. A dispute between an FTO and its domestic supplier or buyer would be re-
solved according to Soviet domestic procedures and law which again is beyond the
scope of this work.
61. Norberg & Stein, supra note 47, at 177.
62. Leff, The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the U.S.S.R. and the
West, 24 ARB. J. 1, 11 (1969).
63. Id. at 11.
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ception was the fear of Western courts and arbitral bodies as indicated
in a statement by Max Litvinoff at the Hague in 1922, "that the Sovi-
ets had to refuse to submit to commercial arbitration by citizens of
third states or by third states themselves. "" Before the evolution of
FTO's, however, the Soviet Union in its early years, "was compelled by
its economic weakness and diplomatic isolation to conduct its trade
through missions [trade representations] located in foreign countries."65
Usually these missions "were forced . . . to submit to the jurisdiction
of foreign courts." 66 When this occurred, "the restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity would allow jurisdiction and execution against the So-
viet state, should it lose."6
Another goal the FTAC served for early Soviet leaders was ideo-
logical - that is, the FTAC would allow the Soviets the "freedom to
move away from concepts of traditional private international law,"
when necessary or desirable.6 8 At the same time, the Soviets fully real-
ized that in order for the FTAC to ever be successful, Western firms
had to voluntarily consent to arbitrate disputes in Moscow. To achieve
that consent, "recognition had to be given to procedures and substan-
tive law that would satisfy the expectations of the West."'"
Thus, the twin goals of avoiding dispute resolution before hostile
Western courts and enhancing the international reputation of Soviet
commercial and legal institutions, coupled with the increased bargain-
ing power of Soviet trade negotiators via FTO's, provided the impetus
for the creation of the FTAC. 0
B. FTAC - Legal Structure: Relationship to Other Soviet
Institutions
The FTAC, as noted earlier, was created by resolution of the Cen-
tral Executive Committee in 1932 and attached to the U.S.S.R. Cham-
ber of Commerce. This relationship with the Chamber of Commerce
has been the focus of most, if not all, of the criticism of the FTAC over
the years. This structural bias is said to arise because "the U.S.S.R.
Chamber of Commerce and Industry . . . is under the supervision of
the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Trade to which the FTO's are also
64. Norberg & Stein, supra note 47, at 175.
65. King-Smith, Communist Foreign Trade Arbitration, 10 HARv. INT'L L. J. 34,
35 (1969).
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id.
68. Norberg & Stein, supra note 47, at 175.
69. Id. at 176.
70. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 9.
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subordinate."" Thus, the problem is that "a Chamber of Commerce of
a Communist country is a creature of public legislation and an integral
arm of a monolithic foreign-trade structure, designed to promote the
state interest under the express supervision of its Ministry of Foreign
Trade."72
It was little consolation to those inclined toward the opinion ex-
pressed above that "the Chamber of Commerce is a "social" rather
than "state" institution, which means that it is a voluntary association,
and the members of the arbitration panels are usually university profes-
sors and other specialists in law and economics. ' '73
Critics of the FTAC note Article 124 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution
which provides that members of the Communist Party are "the leading
core of all organizations, both social and state. 77 This article served to
reinforce the critics' conclusions that the FTAC is "in fact [an] admin-
istrative agenc[y] of [its] respective government[s] in the guise of arbi-
tration, and not [an] arbitration tribunal[s] . . . at all." 75
Another critic, King-Smith went further and argued that "the
FTAC is not in fact an arbitration tribunal but a national court [and
therefore that awards of the FTACJ should not be given effect by
Western countries where the judgments of Communist courts would
not ordinarily be enforced."76
However, this criticism was effectively rendered moot with "the
signing of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by the U.S.S.R. and Western
countries including the United States. [Such treaty, inter alia, provid-
ing] that contracting states must enforce foreign arbitral awards . . .
within the scope of [the treaty] 'in accordance with the rules of proce-
dure of the territory where the award is relied upon.' "77
C. FTAC Operational Structure: Jurisdiction of the FTAC and
Composition of Arbitration Panels
FTAC proceedings are currently governed by the 1975 "Statute
71. Id. at 50.
72. Kotlarchuk, supra note 1, at 468 (quoting Pizar, The Communist System of
Foreign-Trade Adjudication, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1426 (1959)).
73. Berman & Bustin, supra note 1, at 51.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Pizar, Treatment of Communist Foreign Trade Arbitration in
Western Courts, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION: A ROAD TO WORLDWIDE
COOPERATION 106 (M. Domke ed. 1958)).
76. Kotlarchuk, supra note 1, at 469 (citing King-Smith, Communist Foreign
Trade Arbitration, 10 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 34 (1969)).
77. Id. (quoting Article III of the 1958 Convention).
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on the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission at the USSR Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, Approved by the Decree of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 16th April 1975, No. 1351-
IX [hereinafter the Statute]"8.7  This ten article statute supplants the
original 1932 statute. However, as the 1975 statute essentially tracks
the 1932 statute with minor modifications to be discussed below, the
force majeure analysis is not affected by the new statute.
Article 1 of the 1975 Statute defines the scope of FTAC authority.
The FTAC, as a standing arbitration body:
shall settle disputes resulting from contractual and other civil-law
relations arising between lay persons of different countries in the
course of foreign trade and other international economic and scien-
tific-technological contracts. 9
The two significant changes in Article 1 of the 1975 version of the
Statute are that it permits arbitration of non-contractual civil law rela-
tions and that it makes explicit what has been a long-standing practice,
namely that the FTAC can arbitrate "disputes arising between subjects
of various countries." 80 In practice, the FTAC on occasion decides dis-
putes between two non-Soviet parties, usually Eastern Bloc FTO's.
Article 2 of the Statute is also primarily jurisdictional. Significant
for this paper is the provision that the FTAC:
shall entertain disputes where the parties have agreed in writing to
submit to its consideration [and] . . . disputes which the parties
are bound to refer to it in virtue of international agreements. 8'
Article 3 of the Statute provides that disputes:
78. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 196-97.
79. Id. at 196.
80. Kotlarchuk, supra note 1, at 472.
81. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 196. The most significant interna-
tional agreement which would provide for arbitration before the FTAC is the Comecon
General Conditions of Delivery for the sale of goods which essentially "prescribes the
commercial law that regulates all of the contracts concluded by the [Eastern Block
FTOs] .... [It provides] a unified international sale law for commercial contracts
that are concluded in foreign trade within Comecon." T. W. HOYA, supra note 1, at 10.
It was adopted in 1958 and is, obviously, of major importance in terms of promoting
uniformity in private international trade law. The General Conditions of Delivery have
also been adopted on a bilateral basis with such countries as Finland. Unfortunately, as
this subject is much beyond the scope of this effort, the reader is referred to T. W.
HOYA, EAST-WEST TRADE, supra note 1, at 10 for a full discussion of the subject.
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shall be settled by Arbitrators designated by the Presidium of the
USSR Chamber of Commerce . .. for a period of 4 years from
among persons possessing the special knowledge to solve the
disputes. 82
In Mr. Kotlarchuk's opinion, this provision is the most significant
change from the earlier statute.8" It may in fact be a Soviet response to
the structural bias criticism of the FTAC. In summary, the old statute
provided for fifteen arbitrators appointed for one year; the new statute
allows for a term of four years in which members are confirmed with
no restriction on the number of members.8
According to Kotlarchuk, these changes may facilitate the ap-
pointment of non-Soviet arbitrators which would alleviate, to some ex-
tent, a constant criticism of the FTAC that, while non-Soviets have
never been formally barred from the FTAC, in practice all have been
Soviets.85
It is also argued that the longer term of four years with open-
ended membership and confirmation instead of appointment of mem-
bers may contribute to the perception of independence on the part of
arbitrators.86 As a further reinforcement to the perception of indepen-
dence of FTAC arbitrators, Article 4 of the Statute explicitly states
that "[t]he arbitrators . . . [shall be] independent and impartial in ful-
filling their duties. '87
Article 5 basically outlines the composition of arbitration panels
for particular hearings. An arbitration panel can consist of three arbi-
trators or one. The election or appointment of specific arbitrators for a
case is made pursuant to the FTAC Rules of Procedure.88 Parties to a
case can appear "directly or through their duly authorized representa-
tives" pursuant to Article 6 of the Statute.88 These representatives can
be foreign citizens.
Articles 7 and 10 of the Statute provide that the FTAC can deter-
mine the amount and form of security which may be required for a
claim and for the determination of arbitration fees. The fees are based
on a sliding schedule proportional to the amount of the claim and sub-
82. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 196-97.
83. Kotlarchuk, supra note 1, at 474.
84. Id. A minimum panel of 15 arbitrators is required.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 197.
88. Id. For a discussion of these Rules, see infra notes 93-116 and accompanying
text.
89. Id. at 197.
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ject to the approval of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of
Commerce.9 °
The Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce approves
the FTAC Rules of Procedure, pursuant to Article 8 of the Statute.9'
Article 9 provides that FTAC awards are final, without appeal, and
that parties should voluntarily carry out those awards. In the event the
award is not voluntarily enforced, it can "be enforced according to law
and international agreement." 92
D. FTAC Rules of Procedure
The FTAC procedures are currently governed by "the Rules of
Procedure in the [FTAC] at the USSR Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, approved by the Decision of the Presidium of the USSR
Chamber of Commerce and Industry dated the 25th June, 1975 [here-
inafter FTAC Rules]." g These rules supplant the rules in effect since
1932, and track the earlier version for the most part. Moreover, as the
FTAC Rules recite many of the statutory choice of law and substantive
law provisions (discussed earlier in foreign trade law) as well as provi-
sions of the FTAC statute, such provisions will not be examined here.
94
Generally, a case is instituted before the FTAC by filing a state-
ment of claim which specifies "the claimant's demands as well as the
circumstances of fact and law on which he bases his claim and evidence
corroborating these circumstances. 95 A claim must also state the juris-
dictional basis for the FTAC as well as the claimant's choice of arbi-
trator, if three are to be used.96 Once the jurisdiction of the FTAC is
established, Article 31 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the
U.S.S.R. provides that "an ordinary court shall refuse to admit the
statement of claim. 9 7
In the event a panel of three is utilized for a hearing, at the claim-
ant's option, the claimant selects one, the respondent selects one, and
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. If the Soviet party fails to comply with an award, section 201 of the
RSFSR Civil Code provides the procedure for court enforcement. Kotlarchuk, supra
note 1, at 479. The U.N. Convention ... [on] Arbitral Awards discussed supra note
77 would provide for enforcement against foreign parties of signatory countries.
93. U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 198.
94. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
95. Lebedev, supra note 38 at 102. See also FTAC Rules, §§ 13 & 14, U.S.S.R.
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 203.
96. FTAC Rules 13(2)(a)(e), U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 203.
97. Lebedev, supra note 38, at 95.
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the two named arbitrators elect a chairman. 8 If one arbitrator is se-
lected to hear the case, the parties can agree to the arbitrator or have
one appointed by the President of the FTAC pursuant to section 18 of
the FTAC Rules. 99
Other procedural provisions of general interest include: how the
FTAC handles the clerical work associated with a hearing; that the
hearings usually are conducted in Moscow; that any documents that
are presented by a party should be in the language of the contract or
Russian; and that the FTAC can order documents translated into Rus-
sian.100 FTAC hearings are conducted in Russian, although translators
will be appointed at the requesting party's expense; costs are deter-
mined according to a sliding fee schedule; hearings are generally pub-
lic; and the FTAC will hear counterclaims related to the dispute. 101
As noted earlier, the parties can conduct their cases directly, "or
through their duly authorized representatives." °102 The parties can agree
to allow the FTAC to resolve a dispute based on written evidence with-
out a hearing, but the FTAC can sua sponte order a hearing if it be-
lieves the written evidence is insufficient to resolve the dispute. 0 3
Each party bears the burden of proof for its particular claim or
objection.'0 4 The FTAC can, again, sua sponte demand further evi-
dence as well as appoint experts. 0 5 The parties "are allowed in the
course of the hearing to put questions both to experts and to each other
as well as to witnesses called for examination.' 0 6 Parties can object to
an arbitrator, expert, or interpreter on the ground of bias.'07 Arbitra-
tors evaluate all evidence "according to their inner convictions."'' 0 8
The Rules at section 12 provide that the FTAC should determine
disputes "the basis of the applicable rules of substantive law, being
guided - if the dispute has arisen from contractual relations - by the
provisions of the contract and having regard to trade usages."' 0 9 Most
98. FTAC Rules § 4(3); § 13(e); § 17(3) and §18, U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW,
supra note 3, at 200-04. Also, if the parties fail to name an arbitrator or the named
arbitrator fails to elect a chairman, the President of the FTAC appoints one.
99. Id. at 206.
100. Id. at 200-01, FTAC Rules § 5, 6, 7.
101. Id. at 201-10, FTAC Rules §§ 8, 11, 23, 26, 29.
102. Id. at 208, FTAC Rules, § 24, para. 1.
103. Id., FTAC Rules, § 25.
104. Id. at 209, FTAC Rules, § 27, para. 1.
105. Id.
106. Lebedev, supra note 38, at 98.
107. FTAC Rules § 22, U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 207-08.
108. Id. at 209, FTAC Rules, § 27, para. 4.
109. Id. at 202, FTAC Rules, § 12.
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often, Soviet law is the applicable substantive law. 1 '
However, the explicit recognition of trade usage as a basis of law
is significant. As a general matter in Soviet law, "custom is a source of
law if it is recognized by the state." '' A Soviet authority maintains,
"that [there are] repeated cases of application of generally accepted
trade customs when the rules of applicable law and the terms of the
contract concluded by the parties did not contain the necessary provi-
sion."11 2 Thus, international custom may be an important argument for
a foreign party because "precedent and judicial practice are not consid-
ered sources of law and do not create new rules of law either before the
Soviet Courts or the FrAC."'" 3
Finally, a proceeding before the FTAC is concluded by an
award. 4 Disputes are resolved by a majority vote of the arbitrators
and dissenting opinions are permitted. 1 5 Each award must be in writ-
ing and include: the names of the arbitrators; the names of the parties;
the subject matter of the dispute; a factual summary; the decision itself
and the reasons therefor; and an allocation of the fees and expenses." 6
With this background of the Soviet foreign trade organizations
and the structure of its dispute resolution procedure complete, an ex-
amination of FTAC decisions follows in an attempt to ascertain the
objectivity, or lack thereof, of FTAC arbitrators.
VI. FORCE MAJEURE
A. Soviet Understanding of the Doctrine
Article 235 of the RSFSR Civil Code provides that:
an obligation is terminated through impossibility of performance if
it has been caused by circumstances for which the debtor is not
responsible." 7
Accordingly, the general rule for contract liability is that "a
110. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
111. Sadihov, General Characteristics of the U.S.S.R. Legal System, in U.S.S.R.
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 14.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 13-14.
114. FTAC Rules, § 31, U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra note 3, at 210-11.
115. Id. at 211, FTAC Rules, § 32.
116. Id., FTAC Rules § 33. The fees again are based on a sliding scale based on
the amount of the claim. The FTAC is funded on the basis of these fees, and, as the
FTAC possesses no state property, it is not a legal person under Soviet law.
117. Kabotav, Impossibility of Performance, in U.S.S.R. CONTRACT LAW, supra
note 3, at 79.
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debtor is financially liable if fault is present, except in cases envisaged
by law or contract."" 8 The party seeking relief "bears the burden of
proving absence of his fault (intent or negligence)." '1 9 A party is not at
fault and will be relieved of performance and liability "in the presence
of circumstances of insurmountable force (force majeure) preventing
performance of an obligation."120
Article 85 of the RSFSR Civil Code "defines insurmountable
force as an event which is, under the circumstances, extraordinary and
unavoidable."'' The Supreme Court of the RSFSR in 1925, provided
the following definition:
insurmountable force is a relative concept. An obstacle preventing
performance of a contract obligation becomes insurmountable not
by virtue of internal qualities which are inherent in it, but depend-
ing on the correlation of a number of conditions and concrete cir-
cumstances; that which is easily surmountable in one place may
become insurmountable in another place.' 22
Furthermore, for a party to be relieved of performance on force
majeure grounds, he must show a causal relationship between the in-
surmountable force and his inability to perform.' 2"
Force majeure, in Soviet literature, includes "natural phenomena
but also circumstance[s] of social life such as military operations."' 24
One circumstance of social life that the Soviets, somewhat understand-
ably, will not recognize as force majeure is a strike, barring an FTO
contract provision to the contrary. The Soviet attitude towards strikes
is stated as follows, "strikes have become an everyday phenomenon in
capitalist societies and therefore fail to meet the criteria established in
Soviet law for insurmountable force.'' 5
Soviet law generally classifies force majeure in terms of physical,
judicial or economic impossibility.' 21 Physical impossibility encom-
passes the traditional natural disaster type occurrences - such as
floods and earthquakes where the subject matter of the contract is de-
stroyed.127 Barring an agreement to the contrary, the occurrence of one
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 80.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 81.
126. Id. at 82.
127. Id.
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of these events generally relieves a party from performing the
contract.12 8
Judicial impossibility is defined as "that kind of impossibility
which relate[s] to various interdictions by competent authorities." 1 9
This variation of force majeure has presented problems for the Soviets,
the FTAC, and Western commentators and will be discussed fully later
in this paper. " ' In particular, in instances where the Soviet government
denies an export license or otherwise prohibits some type of behavior,
the entire structure of the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade, namely the
relationship of FTO's and the FTAC to the Soviet state, is open to
examination. The FTAC's resolution of this problem has been sharply
criticized.131
Economic impossibility is generally defined as "impossibility of
performance due to changed circumstances in the field of economy."132
In Western legal circles it is somewhat analogous to the doctrine of
frustration of purpose.133 Although the matter is disputed among Soviet
legal scholars, the apparent Soviet position on economic impossibility is
that "economic difficulty of performance including that connected with
changed market situations is insufficient grounds [for] relie[f] of liabil-
ity for non-performance."" This restrictive view of force majeure is,
in the opinion of one Western commentator, the preferred one for inter-
national trade agreements.135
According to Soviet scholars, the consequence of a successful force
majeure argument is, as a general rule, "that a person faced with im-
possibility of performance is not liable for non-performance and ... is
relieved of compensation for losses.1"1 3 Of course, FTO's are free to
agree to other definitions of force majeure and its effect.
B. Traditional International Trade Law Perspective Regarding
Force Majeure
Historically, "a large proportion of the leading cases on excuse
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
131. See Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration discussion, infra at notes 173-83 and ac-
companying text.
132. Kabatov, supra note 117, at 85.
133. See discussion on traditional international views of force majeure, infra at
note 137 and accompanying text.
134. Kabatov, supra note 117, at 85.
135. Professor Berman. See supra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
136. Kabotav, supra note 117, at 86 (citing RSFSR Civil Code Articles 222 and
235).
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have involved international trade transactions." ' Professor Berman, in
an article largely critical of post-World War II liberalization of the
doctrine of force majeure in Western legal circles, states, "impossibility
[of performance] caused by certain types of events (so-called force
majeure) does constitute a cause of exoneration in most of the major
legal systems of the world, although the limits of this doctrine are tra-
ditionally rather narrow."138
Professor Berman maintains that the expansion of force majeure,
accomplished by broadening the definition of impossibility to include
economic impossibility by loosely defining the unforeseeability of cer-
tain events or by expanding the definition of excuse by means of the
doctrine of frustration of purpose, is misguided.13 9 These efforts are
misguided for international trade transactions because "a study of ac-
tual contract practices shows the parties generally insert special clauses
to cover the most varied types of extraordinary risks, and that they take
it for granted that the risk of events not specifically referred to shall be
borne by the obligor.' '14
According to Professor Berman, there are several reasons for the
preference for the restrictive view of force majeure. First, a more ex-
pansive doctrine would impose difficulties for draftsmen attempting to
account for all the possible events which might occur.1 " Second, in in-
ternational trade contracts, the parties are more or less equal in bar-
gaining power and parties assume obligations "with open eyes, for
profit, at a price that reflects the risk of the undertaking; [thus] parties
do not rely on judicially formulated doctrines of excuse."' 4 Most sig-
nificant, in Berman's view, is that in international trade transactions
where the parties are almost by definition from different legal systems
the "sanctity of contract is their surest defense against the peculiarities
of legal rules developed in particular countries. '143
Therefore, Professor Berman argues that "the basic rule for inter-
preting [international trade contracts] should be the rule of absolute
obligation, unless the contract, interpreted in the light of trade custom,
provides otherwise. 144 As will be seen later, the FTAC decisions con-
cerning force majeure arguments generally employ this method of
137. Berman, Excuse for Non-Performance in the Light of Contract Practices in
International Trade, 63 COL. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1963).
138. Id. at 1413.
139. Id. at 1413-15.
140. Id. at 1416.
141. Id. at 1417.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1420.
144. Id. at 1438.
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analysis, that is, a general rule of absolute obligation unless the con-
tract, an international agreement, or a trade custom provides otherwise.
VII. CASE DESCRIPTION
This analysis of FTAC decisions will examine cases reported in
English between 1932-65 where a party raised a force majeure argu-
ment. 1 5 There are twenty-four such cases.
An overview of these cases indicates that of the twenty-one cases
where a Soviet FTO appeared as a party, either as a claimant or re-
spondent, its argument either for or against force majeure was at least
partially successful on fourteen occasions." The FTAC ruled against
the Soviet FTO's position on seven occasions.14 7 Three decisions in-
volved exclusively non-Soviet parties, but of these, only one involved a
non-Soviet bloc party. 4 8
A further breakdown of the twenty-one cases where a Soviet FTO
was a party indicates that in seven cases where a Soviet claimant, as
seller, sued for the foreign buyer's alleged breach of contract, the So-
viet party was at least partially victorious on six occasions. That is, a
foreign buyer's force majeure argument was accepted on one occa-
sion.14 9 Where a Soviet buyer of goods sued a non-Soviet seller who
145. See supra note 2. Decisions of the FTAC counterpart, the Maritime Arbi-
tration Commission, are not discussed, although there are more recent decisions availa-
ble in English, because this would entail both an examination of the Soviet Maritime
Code and general admiralty law. Again, individual FTAC cases are translated into
English in issues of the YEARBOOK OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION and FOREIGN
TRADE; however, the author has assumed, that the FTAC analysis of force majeure has
not substantially changed since 1965.
146. Reference to particular cases is by award number. These cases are published
chronologically by award number in the section entitled Collected Arbitration: Awards
of the U.S.S.R. Foreign Trade Commission found in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, supra note 2. Partially successful refers to an FTAC conclusion which,
although it may or may not have rejected a party's force majeure claim, decides the
case or amends the award on some other ground favorable to the given party. Usually
the amendments were in terms of the FTAC allowing the successful claimant less in
damages than he claimed. The Soviet party was at least partially victorious in Awards
1, 4, 5, 13, 14, 18, 19, 29, 34, 47, 64, 75, 76, 87.
147. Awards 15, 41, 53, 100, 103, 126, 148, supra note 2.
148. Awards 54, 63, 94, supra note 2. Award 94 involved a Dutch buyer of
Rumanian goods, the Dutch party unsuccessfully arguing that force majeure circum-
stances excused its breach of contract.
149. Awards 1, 4, 5, 19, 75, 76 for the Soviet claimant seller. Award 15 against
Soviet claimant seller. Supra note 2. Award 5 - the award of June 2, 1938 in the case
of V/O Exportles [v.] the Firm of Patrick & Thompson Ltd., is somewhat difficult to
classify. In this case a Soviet exporter of wood under a c.i.f. contract sued a British
firm for payment on goods which were delivered, although not the full amount specified
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sought relief on the grounds of force majeure, the FTAC ruled for the
Soviet party in all three cases. 1 0
Where a foreign party sued a Soviet FTO seller, and the FTO
argued force majeure as an excuse to performance, the FTAC ruled for
the foreign claimant on five occasions and excused the Soviet party four
times."" Where a foreign seller sued a Soviet FTO buyer and a force
majeure argument was raised, the FTAC ruled once for the Soviet
party and once against it.162
For purposes of brevity, this analysis will concentrate on the eight
cases where the FTAC accepted, in part, a party's force majeure argu-
ment in an effort to determine whether FTAC decisions follow the re-
strictive definition of force majeure it purports to follow domestically
and which Professor Berman considers preferable for international
trade transactions. 16' Accordingly, the eight cases include: the four
cases where the FTAC accepted a Soviet respondent seller's force
majeure argument; the case where a Soviet respondent buyer's force
majeure argument was accepted; and the case where a foreign respon-
dent buyer's argument was accepted.1' Also included is one case in-
volving two non-Soviet parties where the FTAC accepted, in part, a
force majeure argument as well as one case where a foreign seller sued
for the refund of monies kept by a Soviet buyer on the ground that the
in the contract. The respondent, argued inter alia, that it did not receive the goods per
terms of the contract and bill of lading, e.g., full delivery. The claimant, argued inter
alia, that the force majeure circumstance, "ice conditions" prevented delivery on time
and claimed it had performed per the terms of the contract in attempting to secure
charter for the goods and did in fact charter a vessel. After loading part of the goods,
the vessel became ice bound and delivery was delayed. The FTAC noted in its decision
for the Soviet seller that "[t]he risk of the goods being lost or delayed in transit lies
with the buyer under the contract, which follows from both the nature of the contract
(a c.i.f. sale) and the special contractual provision (§12) as to property rights in the
goods passing to the buyers from the time the goods are loaded on board." Such a
conclusion is apparently consistent with international trade custom for (c.i.f.) contracts.
See Berman supra note 137, at 1429-30.
150. Awards 13, 18, 29, supra note 2. Award 29 is again difficult to classify as it
involved a suit for the refund of advance payments where both parties were relieved of
liability on the grounds of World War II rendering performance impossible.
151. Awards 53, 100, 103, 126, 148 for the foreign buyers; Awards 14, 34, 64, 87
for the Soviet seller.
152. Award 47, in favor of the Soviet party. Award 41, against the Soviet posi-
tion. Award 47 is again somewhat difficult to classify as in effect the Soviet buyer
asserted a successful counterclaim to the seller's claim and the seller's counter defense
force majeure argument was rejected. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 138 and 144.
154. Awards 14, 34, 64, 87 where the Soviet respondent sellers successfully raised
a force majeure argument; Award 47 where Soviet respondent buyer was successful;
and Award 15 where a foreign respondent buyer's argument was successful.
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seller's late delivery was excused by force majeure circumstances. 55
Where an FTAC decision appears inconsistent with other decisions,
such cases will be noted.
Two awards where the FTAC relieved the Soviet respondent seller
of liability for its breach of contract fall within the traditional narrow
limits of force majeure circumstances. Those cases are the "Award of
March 2, 1940 in the Case of. . .Van-der-Heyden (Antwerp) [v.] V/
O Exportles (Award 14)" and "Award of December 21, 1960 in the
Case . . .Cartwright and Company (Importers), Ltd. [v.] V/O Expor-
tles (Award 87)." 15'
Award 14 involved a cost insurance freight contract (c.i.f.) for the
sale of certain wood goods between a Soviet seller and a Dutch buyer.
The Soviet seller chartered a vessel for delivery within the contractu-
ally agreed time. After departing from the loading port, however, the
first vessel was damaged in a collision and forced to return to port. The
Soviet FTO, upon notification of the accident on or about September 2,
1939 and still within the contract dates, attempted to charter another
vessel. The FTO argued, and the FTAC agreed from the evidence pro-
duced, that the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939 so
disrupted the international shipping market that it constituted a force
majeure circumstance by the terms of the contract. Therefore, the con-
tract was cancelled and the parties relieved of performance.1
5 7
Award 87 is an example of the Soviet party winning the battle,
but losing the war. In this case, the Soviet seller respondent entered
into a c.i.f. contract with a British firm. One clause of the contract
essentially provided that in the event one of the listed force majeure
circumstances occurred, namely, ice conditions in the port of loading,
the buyer upon prompt notification to the seller could, at the buyer's
option, purchase the goods, again wood, freight on board, (f.o.b.). The
force majeure circumstances developed, as the loading port was closed
due to icy conditions, and the Soviets sought to cancel.
The British claimant argued that the FTO had denied it an oppor-
tunity to exercise its f.o.b. option. The FTAC agreed and concluded
that a reasonable time for the claimant to exercise its f.o.b. option ex-
tended to the next navigation season. Noting the rising market price of
wood during this time, the FTAC then awarded the British firm ten
percent of the f.o.b. price of the undelivered goods. 158
155. Awards 54 and 41, supra note 2.
156. Awards 14 and 87 respectively, supra note 2.
157. Award 14, supra note 2.
158. Award 87, supra note 2. FTO form contracts generally provide for some
type of liquidated damages or penalty fee. This award also, arguably, represents by
implication a rejection of economic impossibility or frustration of purpose as acceptable
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The "Award of June 20, 1951 in the Case of. . .Soci6t6 Anonyme
Simon Fr re (Paris) [v.] V/O Soyuzpushnina (Award 34)" presents
the converse situation of the case above. Here the Soviet respondent
seller lost the force majeure argument, but won the case. There was
little dispute that World War II constituted a force majeure circum-
stance excusing performance of the contract. The French claimant was
suing for a refund of certain advances made under the contract. The
FTAC concluded that the claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions, determined by. Soviet law as the place of the contract's
conclusion. 59
Arguably, this award is inconsistent with the award granted in the
"Case of . . . V/O Stankoimport [v.] the Joint-Stock Company Swiss
Tool (Zurich) (Award 29)," decided on October 27, 1950, where the
FTAC ruled in favor of a Soviet claimant buyer suing for a refund of
certain advances made to a Swiss company. World War II had pre-
vented performance of the contract. The Swiss respondent unsuccess-
fully raised a statute of limitations argument as a bar to the Soviet
claim.160 In fairness to the FTAC, and possibly as the only way to dis-
tinguish the cases, the FTAC in Award 34 listed three alternative dates
at which force majeure circumstances would have tolled the running of
the statute of limitations under Soviet law. Under all three situations
the claim was barred."'
Award 64 is the last case where the FTAC ruled in favor of a
Soviet respondent seller's defense. Because this is the infamous Israeli-
Soviet Oil Arbitration case, it is discussed in detail later in this note. 6'
In summary, of the cases considered so far, there is nothing which
would indicate that the FTAC is not applying a restrictive application
of force majeure circumstances in that it gives effect to the parties allo-
cations of risk per their contract. In addition, there is no indication that
the FTAC is showing undue favoritism to the Soviet position.
The "Award of February 9, 1955 in the Case . . . of the Greek
Firm Konstantinides (Athens) [v.] V/O Prodintorg (Award 47) ' '163 is
somewhat difficult to classify. The FTAC properly rejected the Greek
firm's counter defense of force majeure. If nothing else, the case is in-
structive as to the FTAC's method of analysis. The dispute involved a
force majeure circumstances. That is, the Soviet FTO was not allowed to repudiate the
contract on the grounds that it made a "bad deal", i.e., the prices of its goods were
increasing.
159. Award 34, supra note 2.
160. Award 29, supra note 2.
161. Award 34, supra note 2.
162. See infra notes 173-92 and accompanying text.
163. Award 47, supra note 2.
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c.i.f. contract for oranges. Due to certain weight shortages on delivery,
the Soviet FTO deducted certain amounts from payment of the
purchase price.
The claimant's position was that the Soviets were at fault for any
weight loss or spoilage, because the Soviets were responsible for ship-
ping delays. Apparently, the Soviet FTO had warned sellers of ice con-
ditions existing at the port of delivery. The claimants contended that
this knowledge was the cause of the delay in shipping the goods from
the port of origin. The FTAC concluded that per the contract, the So-
viet purchaser was under no obligation to warn the sellers of ice condi-
tions; under c.i.f. contracts [by international custom], the purchaser
was not responsible for shipping delays at the port of origin; and most
importantly, according to the independent expert appointed by the
FTAC, the short delay involved could not have caused the spoilage in
question in the case. Therefore, the FTAC ruled in favor of the Soviet
purchaser's counterclaim.1 64
The one occasion where a foreign respondent buyer's force
majeure defense was successful is "Award of April 17, 1940 in the
Case of. . .V/O Soyuznefteexport [v.1 the Latvian Joint-Stock Com-
pany Latviela (Award 65).'1"s Here the non-Soviet party bought oil
products f.o.b. and agreed not to sell the products outside Latvia. The
respondents, in defense to the claim for liquidated damages per the
contract for violation of the restrictive sales clause, maintained that the
force majeure circumstance of the French authorities forcibly captur-
ing and requisitioning the cargo excused its breach. The FTAC re-
jected the respondents' evidence of requisitioning and questioned the
respondents' good faith, namely that the respondents were aware of the
war-time conditions and in taking the route they did, capture was
hardly unforeseeable. The FTAC ruled for respondents nonetheless,
and excused them from liability. Moreover, the FTAC concluded from
independent evidence in its own files that the respondents' vessel and
cargo had been seized. 160
The "Award of November 14, 1952, in the Case of. . .German
Machine Trading Association [v.] V/O Tekhnopromimport (Award
41)" involved a dispute where the East German [GDR] seller sued for
a refund of certain deductions the Soviet buyer had made from the
164. Award 47, supra note 2. The distinction in terms of the international custom
c.i.f. contracts between this case and Award 5, supra note 147, is that in Award 47 the
delay occurred before the goods had left the port of origin, and therefore, the bill of
lading had not been issued, while in Award 5 the delays occurred in transit.
165. Award 15, supra note 2.
166. Id.
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purchase price of goods because of a late delivery. 167 The seller success-
fully argued that delivery was late because the American authorities
had blockaded the GDR border from the West German [FRG] border
and such blockade had made it impossible for the East German seller
to secure a critical piece of equipment required for it to perform the
contract. Apparently, the part was not available elsewhere, and there-
fore, performance was objectively impossible. The FTAC also rejected
the Soviet buyer's argument that the seller had failed to comply with
the notice requirements for force majeure circumstances of the General
Provisions on the Delivery of Goods Agreement between the GDR and
U.S.S.R. because the agreement was not yet in effect at the time the
contract was entered into. 68
The "Award of September 17, 1956 in the Case of .. .Foreign
Trade Association ...Prague [v.] State Import/Export Organization
• . .Sofi (Award 54)" is a classic example of a natural disaster excus-
ing a party's performance.'6 9 Here an earthquake and a subsequent
flood in the Bulgarian seller's mine, which was the only mine capable of
producing lead ore of the quality specified by the contract, reduced the
mine's production capacity by fifty-nine percent. The FTAC accord-
ingly excused the seller from supplying fifty-nine percent of the quan-
tity stated in the contract. But because the FTAC interprets objective
impossibility almost literally, it held the seller liable for its failure to
deliver to the Bulgarian buyer a pro rata share of the mine's forty-one
percent remaining capacity. Damages were based on the contractually
specified penalty percentage.1
7 0
As a preface to the discussion on the Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration
case, an example of what is not a force majeure circumstance is useful.
In "Award of October 1, 1962 in the Case of . ..Technokommerz
GDR [v.] V/O Machinoexport (Award 100)," the Soviet respondent
seller essentially maintained that his failure to deliver certain goods
according to contract requirements should be excused due to the recon-
struction work at the FTO's domestic supplier's plant.17 ' The FTAC
rejected this argument, concluding that such delays were not a force
majeure circumstance under paragraph 46 of the General Conditions
for Delivery of Goods, CMEA (otherwise referred to as Comecon).
167. Award 41, supra note 2.
168. Id. See also clause 45 of the General Provision on Delivery which is the
predecessor of the multilateral Comecon Agreement and sets forth certain notice re-
quirements and certificate procedures when a party intends to assert a force majeure
argument; see supra note 81.
169. Award 54, supra note 2.
170. Id.
171. Award 100, supra note 2.
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Furthermore, such delays were not unforeseeable, inevitable or excep-
tional. 17 1 In effect, the FTAC refused to depart from the restrictive
definition of force majeure and recognize the doctrine of economic im-
possibility in the guise of frustration of purpose or to define liberally
unforeseeability to protect a Soviet party. Additionally, in contrast to
the case below, the FTAC refused to relieve a Soviet party for acts by
other agents of the Soviet state - e.g., domestic organizations.
The last case for consideration and certainly the most famous in
terms of international comment is the Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration
case. Formally known as "Award of June 19, 1958, in the Case of...
Israeli Firm Jordan Investments Ltd. [v.] V/O Souznefteexport,
(Award 64)," the case involved an Israeli firm's f.o.b. contract to
purchase 650 tons of oil from a Soviet FTO. 1 3 After the signing of the
contract, the Soviet FTO applied for an export permit from the Minis-
try of Foreign Trade. Unfortunately, the 1956 Egypt-Israeli war broke
out before the export permit was issued. On November 5, 1956, the
Ministry informed the FTO that its permit request was denied. More-
over, performance of the contract was prohibited. 74
The Soviet seller then informed the Israeli firm that the export
license had been cancelled and that such cancellation represented a
force majeure circumstance according to the contract. The Israelis de-
nied that such an event constituted a force majeure circumstance and
filed a claim for damages of over two million U.S. dollars.17 5
The Israelis made the following arguments: the sellers had a duty
to obtain the export license per international custom of f.o.b. contracts;
the buyers had not contractually agreed to release the sellers of this
obligation; the Foreign Trade Ministry had no right to prohibit per-
formance of the contract; per Article 119 of the RSFSR Civil Code,
only objective impossibility relieved a party of liability and as oil is a
generic good, the seller had not established that it could not secure the
goods elsewhere; and the Trade Ministry's prohibition could not be
considered force majeure as it and the seller were agencies of the same
state. 7
6
The Soviet FTO's arguments were: that the license denial was a
force majeure circumstance per the contract; it was under no duty to
obtain the license; as denial of the license was unforeseen and insur-
mountable, Article 118 of the RSFSR Civil Code relieved it of liabil-
172. Id.
173. Award 64, supra note 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The Code provisions cited above may vary from the ones cited earlier as
the earlier discussion referred to the RSFSR Civil Code of 1964.
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ity; Article 119 did not apply, and even if it did, the prohibition by the
Ministry of Trade made performance objectively impossible; notwith-
standing the FTO's legal independence, it was legally required to fol-
low the order of the Ministry of Trade.1 "
Basically, accepting the FTO's arguments, the FTAC dismissed
the claim concluding that Article 118 of the RSFSR Civil Code was
the relevant statute, and therefore, a party was released from liability
for causes beyond the party's control. The FTAC, without direct refer-
ence to the war itself, concluded that the denial of the export license
was beyond the FTO's control and unforeseeable. Moreover, the FTAC
interpreted an ambiguous clause in the contract, apparently a result of
translation difficulties, to reinforce its conclusion that a party is ex-
cused for any cause beyond its control. 17 8
The FTAC made short shrift of the claimant's other arguments. It
noted simply that the FTO was a legal personality in its own right and
not an "organ of state power. 17 9 Performance of the contract was ob-
jectively impossible as the Ministry of Trade prohibited performance of
the contract regardless of the availability of non-Soviet oil. Finally, the
FTAC concluded that the FTO seller was under no duty to obtain an
export license, because the contract made no reference to export
licenses. 180
The Israeli-Soviet Oil decision was, to put it mildly, not well re-
ceived in the West.181 Critics of the decision noted the fact that the
decision was announced an hour after the conclusion of the final of
thirteen hearings and claimed the decision was "a foregone conclusion
in view of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime. "182 It was
claimed that the Israelis were denied an opportunity to present essen-
tial proof.1 88 The decision brought the relationship of the Soviet state,
FTO's and the FTAC into acute focus.
177. Id.
178. Id. The clause involved the English version of the contract which had been
signed by the parties. The clause was an addition to the standard force majeure clause
and read "but also by any other cause beyond the control of the party." Apparently
this clause was a carry-over from the Russian text of earlier contracts between the
same parties. See, Berman's comments, infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
179. Award 64, supra note 2.
180. Id.
181. See generally Notes on Israeli-Soviet Arbitration 13 ARB. J. 159 (1958);
Domke, The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 787 (1959); Berman,
Force Majeure and the Denial of an Export License Under Soviet Law: A Comment on
Jordan Investments v. Soiuznefteksport, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1128 (1960); Left, supra
note 62, at 1.
182. See Notes on Israeli-Soviet Arbitration, supra note 181, at 160.
183. Id.
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Professor Berman was one of the few who attempted to make an
in-depth analysis of the merits of the case.1 84 But on the two principal
issues of concern to his paper, Professor Berman was unable to "ex-
plain" the decision using a strict legal analysis. 85 The first issue he
addressed was the effect of the "but also" clause at the end of the
contract's force majeure clause.1 86 After noting that the entire contract
was badly drafted, particularly the English translation, he argued that
if the Soviets accept "a restrictive theory of force majeure [,then] [the
contract presents] a hopeless ambiguity" by incorporating by reference
Article 118 of the RSFSR Civil Code which he maintained is some-
what broader than the traditional force majeure circumstance.1 87 In
any event, Professor Berman concluded that the decision required more
analysis than the FTAC's simply defining the meaning of terms in the
clause to correspond to the understanding of Article 118.188
The second issue involved the analysis of international custom con-
cerning the allocation of risk in obtaining export licenses in f.o.b. con-
tracts where the contract does not allocate that risk. Although far from
universal, the general rule in f.o.b. contracts appears to be that absent
a provision to the contrary, "the risk of denial of an export license is on
the exporter."' 89 The policy rationale supporting this principle is that
"it is just to impose the risk of government action upon the party which
is in the better position to influence the action."' 190 Moreover, Berman
maintains that this position is supported by Soviet domestic law. 19'
In short, the conclusion is inescapable that the FTAC did a great
disservice to its reputation and the Israeli party by giving such short
shrift to the export license argument in particular and to all the argu-
ments in general. As Professor Berman notes, however, many of the
criticisms concerning the procedural aspects of the case were simply
unfounded. For example, he notes that the Soviet counsel assisting the
Israelis in their presentation of the case provided some helpful
arguments. 9
184. Berman, supra note 137. In fairness to Messrs. Domke and Leff, their arti-
cles, although critical in general, did recognize the possibility that reasonable men can
differ and analyzed the merits of the case, in contrast to the commentary in Notes on
Israeli-Soviet Arbitration, supra note 181.
185. Berman, supra note 137, at 1138-40. Berman discusses the obvious political
overtones and implications of the case.
186. Id. at 1133-34.
187. Id. at 1134.
188. Id. at 1136.
189. Id. at 1141; see also Domke, supra note 181, at 791.
190. Berman, supra note 137, at 1143.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1145, n.36.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This analysis of FTAC decisions indicates that where a party as-
serts a force majeure argument and can produce sufficient evidence
that an extraordinary unforeseeable circumstance occurs which renders
that party's performance objectively impossible, that party will be ex-
cused from performance and relieved of liability. This assumes that the
party did not assume the risk of the particular event by contract, in-
cluding international understanding of those contractual terms - or
otherwise by international agreement. The accepted force majeure cir-
cumstances in FTAC decisions appear to be traditional ones such as
the "capitalist states," natural disasters, restraint of prices, war, but
not strikes. Its decisions on force majeure circumstances tend to follow
a restrictive interpretation of that doctrine; the method preferred by at
least one prominent Western writer.
With the one possible exception of the Israeli-Soviet Oil case, the
FTAC has prevented its structural association with the Soviet state
from detectably influencing its decisions in favor of Soviet parties. The
1975 statutory revision explicitly declared that FTAC arbitrators re-
main independent and impartial. While it is, of course, debatable
whether in a Socialist state, or any other, objectivity can ever be de-
clared by legislative fiat; the FTAC, as of the publication of Hoya's
book in 1984 193, has not issued a decision widely accused of somehow
being politicized.
Thomas M. Bell
193. T. W. HOYA, supra note I.
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